The Vermont Supreme Court has upheld a trial judge's decision that neither side substantially prevailed under the state's Prompt Pay Act in a dispute over a pond-building contract, so no one gets attorney's fees.
In Lamson v. Goode, 2026 VT 52, decided Nov. 13, Justice Waples wrote that the Windsor Civil Division did not abuse its discretion. The Prompt Pay Act, 9 V.S.A. sections 4001 to 4009, awards reasonable fees to the "substantially prevailing party," but the court said a judge may decide that no one did.
Gregory Lamson sold James Goode 42 acres in Royalton in 2015. Goode later hired Lamson to build a pond on another property Goode owned, and Lamson subcontracted the clearing to Chase Locke. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment for Lamson of $7,500 plus $8,149.32 in prejudgment interest on his contract claim against Goode. Goode was awarded $5,000 on an assault claim, and Locke $15,100 on a counterclaim of extortion. The trial court found defendants collectively came out $4,450.68 ahead and denied both fee requests.
Goode argued he prevailed because Lamson never asked that the Prompt Pay Act claim go to the jury. The Supreme Court said there was no such claim to submit: the statute leaves penalties and fees to the court. It agreed with Lamson that the trial court should not have counted Goode's assault award or Locke's award, because the assault did not arise from the same facts as the pond contract and Locke was not a party to the Prompt Pay Act claim. It called the error harmless because the trial court also found that neither side got what it wanted.
On extortion, Lamson argued Vermont law recognizes no private claim. The trial judge had allowed the counterclaim as "economic duress," relying on an 1878 case, Hoyt v. Dewey, which ordered money returned when it was paid under a fabricated threat. The Supreme Court agreed that reading and noted the jury was told it could award only the value of money or property delivered to Lamson.
Lamson also said $15,100 was far more than Locke sought. The court said he did not preserve that argument with a motion for a new trial and waived it by not ordering a transcript of the first trial day. Given its conclusion, the court wrote, it "need not consider whether to recognize a civil claim for extortion."
