Maine's Supreme Judicial Court has dismissed an appeal from a man who missed the terms of a deferred sentence for reasons the trial judge found excusable, ruling that state law lets only defendants whose failures were inexcusable ask for review.
In State v. Reardon, 2026 ME 109, decided Nov. 19, 2026, Justice Lipez wrote that 17-A M.R.S. section 1904 bars any attack on the "final disposition" of a deferred disposition unless a court found the defendant "inexcusably failed to comply" and then sentenced him. The court called the result "unsatisfying" and said whether and how to address apparent gaps in the deferred-disposition statutes is a question for the Legislature.
Ryan P. Reardon was indicted in June 2021 on aggravated assault, domestic violence assault and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. On July 7, 2022, he entered an agreement with the State under which he pleaded guilty to domestic violence assault. The State dismissed the other two charges. If he met the terms over a two-year deferment, he could withdraw that plea and plead guilty to domestic violence reckless conduct, with an agreed $500 fine. If not, he faced an "open plea" with no agreed sentence recommendation.
The terms included completing a certified domestic violence intervention program and a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment. Reardon injured his knees in late summer and early fall 2022 and then suffered a significant head injury that left him with practically no executive functioning, the opinion says. He never started the program or the evaluation and did not file a motion to modify the requirements.
After a hearing on Sept. 23, 2024, the Piscataquis County trial court found that Reardon failed to comply but that the failure was excusable. It nevertheless ruled, relying on contract principles, that he was not entitled to the agreed outcome. In a written order dated Dec. 12, 2024, it sentenced him to 90 days in jail with all but four days suspended and one year of probation. Reardon argued on appeal that a judge who finds an excusable failure should let the defendant withdraw the plea and plead to the lesser charge.
The court did not reach that argument. Section 1904, it said, allows a discretionary appeal only by a defendant found to have failed inexcusably, and Reardon was not in that group. It noted that section 1903 gives courts no direction for an excusable failure and that the Legislature, not the court, would have to address the gap.
In a footnote, the court advised parties and judges that the plea agreement used here, which promised a new lesser charge after plea withdrawal, is not one the deferred-disposition statutes contemplate. It said the parties could instead have filed the lesser charge at the time of the original plea.
Walter F. McKee and Kurt C. Peterson represented Reardon, and Peterson argued. District Attorney Neil E. McLean Jr. and Assistant District Attorney Katherine M. Hudson-MacRae of Prosecutorial District III represented the State, and Hudson-MacRae argued. No statement from either side appears in the opinion. The court heard argument on Dec. 10, 2025.